
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| MEMORANDUM FOR: | National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia |
|-----------------|--|
| FROM:           | Director of Central Intelligence                           |
| SUBJECT:        | Emerging Troubles  |
|                 |  |

- 1. It seems to me that we should resensitize the President and NSC principals on the combination of troubles we see as possibly emerging. This will bring up to date the story we developed in the Don Regan briefing. For this purpose I wonder if you could do the following:
  - Update the very good paper you did on Iran about two months ago.
  - b. Do a similar paper on the Syrian/Iranian/Libyan squeeze to surround Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon.
  - c. Perhaps there should be a separate piece on Lebanon. See the attached article by Georgie Anne Geyer which appeared in this morning's <u>Washington</u> <u>Times</u>.

| d. | Do an update on the piece you did on Sudan shortly after the one you did on Iran. |               |
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|    |   | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
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William J. Casey

Attachment

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## THE WASHINGTON TIMES 19 August 1985

GEORGIE ANNE GEYER

## Planned chaos in Lebanon?

everal years ago, some members of the Lebanese government of more-or-less President Amin Gemayel estimated the value of the shells and bullets expended on only one night of savage fighting there at \$5 million.

That kind of extraordinary outlay of money and weaponry — a development privately remarked upon with a kind of awe among analysts from Western Europe to the Middle East — is leading to some startling new speculation on what Lebanon really is all about.

Some of them are saying that, far from being an accidental or out-of-control war, Lebanon, on many levels, is a deliberate and planned chaos. As one analyst intimately connected with the war put it to me:

"The story not told is that this is an international war. It is the Spanish Civil War of our times. At stake are a number of things, from the fate of the Palestinians to whether the Soviets take over the whole area.

"One key area the Soviets did not control was Lebanon. Now, there is

The Lebanon war most definitely is being used and molded from outside, in particular by the

Soviets.

Soviet control — but negatively." He paused for emphasis. "This is Vietnam II," he added.

What is important to watch in Lebanon is the sheer amount of weaponry and money for weaponry. This tells both the story and at the same time why this story is so dangerous that none of these analysts wanted to be quoted.

Basically, they agree on this argument:

Lebanon, with its longtime deli-

cate balance between factions, could have fallen apart into warring clans and sectors. But, without the little-reported and unprecedented international supply of arms, it would never have reached the stage of savagery that goes on day after day even now.

There are missiles launched from trucks, and they are shot off at the rate of 36 every half-minute. For the most common gun, the 152mm, every shell costs \$1,000. Private armies have D-72 tanks, which the Soviets give to some Warsaw Pact countries; and some Palestinian groups have helicopters.

The enormous preponderance of weapons comes across the Black Sea from the Soviet Union through the Bosporus to land at such ports as Tyre and Latakia. Some come directly by land across Syria, again with Soviet markings.

Figures used by the Foreign and

Georgie Anne Geyer is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Commonwealth Office in London say that Syria, the Soviets' main foothold in the Arab world, heads the list of Soviet-arms recipients for the last five years. In 1983 alone, supplies to it were worth about \$1.7 billion.

One curiosity also little known is that the Soviets obtained about 20 percent of their hard currency earnings, again in 1983 alone, from repayments of principle and interest on arms sales in these countries.

So while the attention of the leaders of the world's traditionally organized countries (the United

States and Western Europe) is focused on the "big" issues of nuclear arms and their control, it is telling that virtually no one is watching the supposedly "peripheral" area of Lebanon.

I called the prestigious International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and asked whether they had any information on the amounts of arms going into Lebanon.

"In a word, no," a military spokesman told me. "We watch the big stuff." Then he asked the key question: "How do you cover stuff from the Syrians to their proteges? From Iran to the Hezbollah? To Christians from Cyprus? Knowledgeable sources can't,

because the data is too scarce."

Because the entire Lebanon war is orchestrated in such an "irregular" manner, the constituted authority of the world cannot get a grip on it. And, indeed, that is precisely why it is orchestrated in such a way.

ne caveat: it would be far too much to say that the entire Lebanon war, which now has gone on for 10 horrifying years, was planned from afar — from Moscow or Damascus. There are too many fissiparous protagonists in Lebanon.


But what begins to become clear when you separate some of the

strands of the Lebanon war is that it most definitely is being used and molded from outside, in particular by the Soviets, through their macabre arms input and the control that gives them.

The useful chaos of the moment can, then, in their eyes, lead to a quite different future, as yet unforeseen, one in which the Soviet Union plays a major role. The analysts also say, for instance, that the little-known Lebanese Communist Party increasingly is inserting itself into important posts.

The Spanish Civil War of our time? When one thinks about it, it doesn't seem as unlikely as it might

sound at first.



S-E-C-R-E-T

DDI- <u>0286</u>/-85

4 June 1985

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | Director of Central Intelligence  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|-----------------|---|---------------|
| VIA:            | Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence   |               |
| FROM:           | John L. Helgerson<br>Director of African and Latin American Analysis  |               |
| SUBJECT:        | Mozambique  |               |
| 1. I am co      | oncerned about the policy implications of the deterioration onomic situation in Mozambique, and would like to bring y | rou           |

up to date on recent developments that have heightened our concern and what we are doing to improve our reporting for the policy community.

2. Over the past six months the RENAMO insurgency has gained ground and is now threatening a major attack on Maputo. Economic discontent is rising as the regime is unable to deal with its military and economic

problems. 25X1 25X1 25X1

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